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Review Article
Unawareness in schizophrenia: Neuropsychological and 
neuroanatomical findings
LORENZO PIA, phd AND MARCO TAMIETTO, phd
Department of Psychology and Neuropsychology Research Group, University of Turin, Torino, Italy
Abstract The lack of insight in schizophrenia has so far been interpreted as a primary symptom of the illness,
namely a defensive mechanism rather than a neurologically-based condition. However, recent find-
ings have emphasized its relationship with damage to specific brain areas as well as the domain
specificity in which it may occur. This supports a neuropsychological interpretation of the lack of
insight in schizophrenia. The present article reviews the foregoing data, and takes into account the
most relevant anatomo-clinical results. There is evidence that the lack of insight in schizophrenia
may occur as a neurological disease per se following brain damage that seems related to frontal
lobe areas. Additionally, it could either be related to all aspects of the disease or be domain-specific,
occurring for one kind of symptom but not for others. These data indicate several analogies with
the phenomenon called anosognosia for a neurological deficit.
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INTRODUCTION
In Liber V, Epistula IX,1 Seneca described a lady deny-
ing her blindness. This is possibly the first report of
unawareness of a neurological deficit. However, the
term ‘anosognosia’ was introduced 2000 years later by
Babinski2 to indicate diminished awareness or denial of
the existence of deficits due to neurological disease
(see Prigatano and Schacter3 for an extensive review).
At that time, the disease was interpreted as a symptom
of a body schema disorder build-up by individual
somato-sensory experiences.4 During the 1930s, vari-
ous authors pictured anosognosia in terms of a gener-
alized defensive mechanism or psychological denial
that protected patients from the disease.5 This
approach claimed that premorbid features of person-
ality were the primary cause of illness onset, although
certain data then contradicted this perspective. First,
anosognosia is more frequent after right-brain damage
and during the acute and postacute phases of the ill-
ness; a general defensive mechanism view would
predict that anosognosia for both right and left
disturbances should increase with time (a goal-directed
mechanism would take time to consolidate). Second,
anosognosia can be highly selective, occurring as a
domain-specific phenomenon: the patient is aware of
certain symptoms or functional deficits, but not others.
In addition, a patient can be anosognosic in personal
reports (i.e. when asked why they are in hospital and
what their deficit is), but not in a self-evaluation task
(i.e. when they are questioned on their ability to exe-
cute a task involving impaired function) and vice versa.
These latter data contradict a motivational account of
the  disease  (see  Bisiach  and  Geminiani1  and  Berti
et al. 6 for an extensive discussion on this topic).
The ‘lack of insight’ into one’s own illness in people
with schizophrenia has been a well-known phenome-
non ever since Bleuler coined the diagnostic term. The
term states a broad construct encompassing unaware-
ness of the disorder, the effects of treatment, social
consequences, the occurrence of psychiatric symptoms
and difficulty in labelling them. In the past 2 years, the
lack of insight has been considered an unconscious or
conscious refusal rather than an inability. Nevertheless,
numerous authors have recently claimed that anosog-
nosia, the diminished awareness or denial of the exist-
ence of deficits due to neurological disease, might have
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similarities with the concept of lack of insight: persis-
tence despite all contrary evidence, confabulations to
explain away symptoms, frontal lobe impairments and
domain specificity. Accordingly, these authors used the
term ‘unawareness’ (or ‘anosognosia’) rather than the
psychoanalytic ‘lack of insight’ in order to highlight this
neuropsychological point of view (see References 7–11
for a discussion). These findings have been somewhat
contradictory, and it has not yet been clearly proven
that impaired frontal lobe functioning is a causal expla-
nation for poor insight (while the deficit in cases of
anosognosia is certainly related to brain damage).
However, the accumulated evidence for a prominent
role of the frontal lobe is intriguing, and merits more
careful review. The authors will focus on this literature,
attempting to discuss its relevance for the understand-
ing of the term ‘unawareness’. References from the lit-
erature were obtained by both manual and electronic
search methods (Medline database combining key-
words: anosognosia, unawareness, schizophrenia, lack
of awareness, lack of insight and tardive dyskenisia) up
to the end of 2005. A historical introduction to the sub-
ject is followed by a brief description of the anatomo-
clinical features of schizophrenia, and then an analysis
of those studies dealing with the relationship between
unawareness and schizophrenia.
ANATOMO-CLINICAL PICTURE 
OF SCHIZOPHRENIA
Schizophrenia is a spectrum disease covering several
conditions of different etiology. At present, several the-
oretical interpretations converge to systemic models
including neurotransmission, genetic changes and neu-
rodevelopmental malformation of brain structures.
The anatomy of schizophrenia is a long-debated issue.
The data are sometimes conflicting and yet there is no
clear evidence about the specific role of the different
brain structures in schizophrenia onset. The literature
reports that several brain regions might be involved:
ventricles, frontal and temporal lobe subregions,
medial temporal and inferior parietal regions, and sub-
cortical structures (see References 12–14 for reviews).
From a clinical point of view, schizophrenia is charac-
terized by profound disruption in emotion and cogni-
tion, affecting the most fundamental human attributes:
language,  thought,  perception,  emotion,  and  sense
of self.
The symptomatology can be subdivided into positive
symptoms (traits or behaviors that are ‘added’ to the
personality) and negative symptoms (capabilities or
aspects of personality that are ‘lost’). Positive symp-
toms include hallucinations, delusions, disorganized
speech and behavior; negative symptoms, in contrast,
consist of the inability to experience pleasure, lack of
emotion, loss of motivation and deficits of attention
and thought.
Several papers showed that at least 50% of patients
with schizophrenia are unaware of their disease (see
References 7–15 for instances). This can significantly
affect treatment compliance. The neuropsychological
data come from studies focused on tardive dyskenisia,
positive and negative symptoms. Other components of
the complex symptomatology characterizing schizo-
phrenia, for example amnesia, perceptual deficits and
incoherent language, do not appear in the literature.
The authors’ review will, therefore, be focused on these
studies.
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SYMPTOMS
Neuropsychological studies
A number of authors have shown that unawareness is
not related to general cognitive16,17 or frontal lobe18–21
impairments. Cuesta and colleagues, for instance,19
administered to 35 schizophrenics the Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test (WCST), a classic measure of abstract con-
ceptual skills and cognitive flexibility which is very sen-
sitive to the acute effects of frontal lobe injury. No
correlation was found between poor performance on
WCST and unawareness. These results lead to consider
unawareness still a primary symptom of schizophrenia
or a consequence of clinical/individual variables.16,19
However, several other papers suggested that una-
wareness might be linked to a poor performance in tests
assessing the frontal lobe functions. For instance, Young
and colleagues22 conducted three separate studies
testing 108 patients with chronic schizophrenia diag-
nosed via the revised 3rd edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM-III-R) criteria. Subjects were
administered the standard WCST, measuring the level
of awareness with two instruments of demonstrated
validity and reliability: the Scale for the Assessment of
Unawareness of Mental Disorder (SUMD) and the
basic activities of daily living (ADL). The authors
showed a clear and consistent association between
poor WCST performance and unawareness. In another
study, it was proved that such a kind of correlation can
be highly specific.23 In detail, the authors recruited 21
subjects with a diagnosis of schizophrenia based on the
Structured Clinical Interview (SCID) for the 4th edition
of the DSM (DSM-IV). Unawareness was evaluated
with the SUMD. The subjects also underwent an exten-
sive neuropsychological examination and it was found
that SUMD correlated significantly only with WCST
but not with the other neuropsychological test. The
relationship between tests assessing frontal lobe func-
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tions and unawareness has been confirmed also in sev-
eral other papers.24–32
These results about the associations between
unawareness and frontal functions tests are somewhat
conflicting. However, the authors must emphasize that
many of the above-mentioned studies cannot be easily
compared because of several methodological differ-
ences such as a-priori hypotheses, sample recruitment,
chronicity, unawareness measures and symptomatol-
ogy. Additionally, unawareness was measured as a uni-
tary variable without considering possible dissociations
within the symptomatology (e.g. positive vs negative
symptoms or subcomponents of executive functions).
Indeed, they often limited the analysis to WCST, which
is a non-specific insight measure. As pointed out by
Donohoe et al.,33 it is essential to prone patients to cog-
nitive tests which can subdivide executive functions
into their different components: inhibition, planning,
working memory, regulation of emotion, motivation
and so on.
Accordingly, other authors explored whether the
association between unawareness and frontal lobe
functions could be a domain-specific phenomenon,
measuring it separately for positive and negative symp-
toms. Mohamed and colleagues34 tested 25 patients
with schizophrenia according to DSM-III-R diagnostic
criteria. They assessed unawareness of the illness with
the SUMD adding four additional subscales based on
the breakdown of items from the Scale for the Assess-
ment of  Positive  Symptoms  (SAPS)  and  the  Scale
for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS).
The scores were unawareness of negative symptoms
(UNS), attribution of negative symptoms (ANS),
unawareness of positive symptoms (UPS), and attribu-
tion of positive symptoms (APS). Patients also had to
perform four tests to evaluate executive functions: Ver-
bal Fluency Test, the Design Fluency Test, the Trail-
Making Test and a modified version of the WCST. The
authors proved that only unawareness for negative
symptoms was significantly correlated to a deficit of the
executive functions. This link has been described in
other papers.15,35–38 On this basis, Mohamed and col-
leagues proposed that negative symptoms could be a
consequence of damage to the executive functions
while the positive symptoms follow damage to other
cognitive functions, a general cognitive deterioration
or an attempt to protect one’s own psychological well-
being. However, some of these authors and others
described a link between positive symptoms and
unawareness.35,37,39,40 Both Amador et al.7 and Kemp
and Lambert37 noted that increased psychosis and
grandiosity (both positive symptoms) were associated
with increased misattribution of psychiatric symptoms.
This might be a specific aspect of insight that may have
a different etiology than unawareness. As has been
demonstrated, schizophrenia patients may have selec-
tive unawareness of some attributes of their illness, but
not of others.7,10,33,41
Recently, Brebion and colleagues42 examined 40 in-
patients meeting DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia.
Positive and negative symptoms were assessed by the
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale for Schizophre-
nia (PANSS). The authors confirmed the correlation
between positive symptoms and unawareness but, in
addition, found that unawareness was inversely corre-
lated with unawareness of emotions or social interac-
tions that are considered typical negative symptoms.
The authors claimed that positive and negative
symptomatology appears to have opposite links to
awareness. The variable correlations between different
symptom clusters (positive vs negative) may suggest
that different elements of awareness may be differen-
tially associated to distinct aspects of schizophrenia.
In summary, neuropsychological findings regarding
the association between positive/negative symptoms
and executive functions is still a matter of debate. Even
when unawareness is analyzed deeply in its subcompo-
nents, the relationships are still unclear. Donohoe et
al.,33 for instance, found that unawareness was corre-
lated to working memory deficits but also to general
cognitive functions impairments rather than to frontal
lobe impairments. These considerations imply that fur-
ther experiments and theoretical reflections are neces-
sary to shed light on this puzzling topic. Nonetheless, it
is fundamental to take into account also the most
recent neuroanatomical studies, which have tried to
examine directly the association between brain regions
and unawareness with structural and functional
imaging.
Neuroanatomical data
The first attempts examined the correlation between
awareness and the brain whole volume without taking
into account different brain areas. In one of the previ-
ously mentioned studies,38 for example, the authors
assessed the relationship between unawareness and
the whole brain volumes in a sample of 78 patients
with DSM-IV schizophrenia. Unawareness was related
to poor WCST performance but not to any global
brain measures. The same lack of correlation has been
found when considering only the cerebral ventricular
enlargement.43 Nonetheless, other authors looked at
the possible association with specific brain regions and
subregions. David,44 for instance, demonstrated that
unawareness was specifically associated to dysfunction
of prefrontal or parietal lobes. In one of the most ‘in-
depth’ anatomical studies,45 the relationship between
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unawareness and eight different frontal lobe subre-
gions was analyzed in 15 patients with chronic schizo-
phrenia. The authors found that unawareness was
associated with a bilateral volume reduction in the
middle frontal gyrus, gyrus rectus, and left anterior cin-
gulate gyrus. More interestingly, they tried to correlate
specific aspects of unawareness with each anatomic
subregion. Overall, unawareness of psychiatric illness
was associated with smaller mid-frontal gyrus, right
gyrus rectus, and left anterior cingulated gyrus, while
the misattribution of specific symptoms was associated
with reduced superior frontal gyrus volume. The
involvement of these frontal lobe areas in unawareness
onset has been confirmed in another study.36 One prob-
lem is that these studies were performed on patients
with chronic schizophrenia, thereby making it difficult
to identify the effects of illness chronicity and exposure
to antipsychotic medications. Shad and colleagues46
investigated  a  sample  of  35  patients  without  effects
of long-term use of antipsychotic medications and
illness chronicity. The authors assessed the unaware-
ness through single questions derived from the items of
the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HDRS). They
analyzed the relationship between dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (DLPFC) volume and unawareness.
Unawareness was significantly correlated with a
smaller right DLPFC volume as compared to those
with preserved insight, independently of global cogni-
tive functioning and illness severity. In a recent paper,47
the possible dissociation between specific aspects of
unawareness and brain subregions45 was confirmed.
The authors demonstrated that the DLPFC was linked
to unawareness per se, while Orbito Frontal Cortex
(OFC) was linked to symptoms misattribution.
Interestingly, in a different research field, some
authors gained important results in order to understand
the neuroanatomical basis of unawareness in schizo-
phrenia. Certain data show common cerebral dysfunc-
tions between schizophrenia and dementia with frontal
lobes atrophy48 on the one hand, and common deficits
between schizophrenia and dementia in tests for frontal
or executive functions on the other.49 These data rein-
force the idea of a close relationship between unaware-
ness in schizophrenia and frontal lobes.
TARDIVE DYSKENISIA
Patients with chronic schizophrenia may show involun-
tary movements of the tongue, lips, face, and trunk
independently of neuroleptic treatment.50 A peculiar
feature of tardive dyskenisia is that patients can be
completely unaware of their own motor deficit.51–56
Interestingly, it might be dissociated along the self/
other continuum. In other words, the ability to detect
and judge the performance of others might be unim-
paired. Smith and colleagues,56 for example, used the
Abnormal Involuntary Movement Scale (AIMS) to
evaluate the presence and severity of tardive dyskeni-
sia in 377 patients with schizophrenia.
The authors asked patients to judge both their own
behavior and that of others. The number of recognized
deficits was significantly greater when they had to
judge others’ behaviors.
The authors hypothesized that the automonitoring
deficits could prevent the awareness of one’s own def-
icit but not that of others.
As for the positive and negative symptoms, some
studies focused on the possible relationship between
unawareness and frontal lobe functions. Waddington
and colleagues57 examined 47 subjects with a DSM-III
diagnosis of schizophrenia. Patients were examined
for tardive dyskenisia and neuropsychological test per-
formance. Results showed an association between
unawareness of the movements and the poor perfor-
mance on WCST. The association has been confirmed
by other authors.58,59
Unawareness for tardive dyskenisia, as well as for
positive and negative symptoms, may occur as a
domain-specific phenomenon. Arango and col-
leagues,51 for instance, were interested in examining
whether unawareness of motor dysfunction and lack of
insight into mental dysfunction are related. They
selected 43 patients in a specialized motor disorder
institute and used the SUMD to assess insight of 43
patients with schizophrenia and tardive dyskenisia.
Unawareness of tardive dyskenisia was weakly corre-
lated with poor insight. The authors concluded that
patients with schizophrenia can be aware of some
symptoms but not of others. Dissociations have been
found also within tardive dyskenisia. Sandyk and
colleagues,60 found that unawareness of one’s own
involuntary movement could be dissociated among dif-
ferent muscle groups. In other words, patients could be
unaware of their dyskenisia for a specific movement
but not for another, akin to what has been reported for
patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia who may be
aware of the deficit in a specific body part but not in
other areas. Lastly, another study61 reported that
patients with schizophrenia may show motor deficits
when requested to perform an act, but not during the
spontaneous behavior itself.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the dramatic disabling nature of schizophre-
nia, many patients are completely unaware of their
own disease. This phenomenon makes rehabilitation
more difficult and is a bad prognostic factor for recov-
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ery. Conversely, unawareness in schizophrenia may
provide us with many important hints for understand-
ing the monitoring process of our own conditions, dis-
closing implicit mental contents, and shedding light on
the neural structures underlying conscious mental pro-
cesses. For a long time, unawareness in schizophrenia
has been described as a symptom without further
specifying its own etiological nature. Nevertheless,
recent neuropsychological findings seem to suggest an
interesting possibility, namely that unawareness in
schizophrenia might be very similar to the neurological-
based condition known as anosognosia. These data can
be summarized into two points:
(i) unawareness in schizophrenia might occur as a neu-
rological disorder per se due to frontal lobes dam-
age. This conclusion is supported by data showing
association between unawareness in schizophrenia
and deficits of the executive functions,15,22–32,34–40,42,57–59
damage to frontal lobe areas36,44–47 as well as with
cognitive and brain impairments in dementia due
to frontal lobe lesions;48,49 and
(ii) unawareness in schizophrenia might occur in the
illness  as  a  whole  or  within  different  domains
of it.  This is supported by the dissociation
between unawareness for negative and positive
symptoms15,34,36,38–42 and by its occurrence only for a
specific movement51,60 or only when questioned.61
Yet the analogy between unawareness in schizophre-
nia and anosognosia is not yet definitive and unques-
tionable. For instance, some studies found that
unawareness was not associated with frontal lobe func-
tions/areas; others showed that it was associated to gen-
eral cognitive deficits. Here, the authors have tried to
stress the importance of deepening the neurological
basis of unawareness in schizophrenia as well as its pos-
sible manifestation as a domain-specific phenomenon.
This should allow clarification of the role of defensive
mechanisms or general mental deterioration and a
more satisfying anatomo-functional picture of
unawareness in schizophrenia. Since unawareness is a
poor prognostic factor for functional recovery, the eti-
ology of the insight problem is imperative in order to tai-
lor and manage the treatment accordingly. The authors
hope that this review can contribute to stimulate further
research and theoretical discussions about the neu-
rocognitive features of awareness in schizophrenia.
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